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BASTARDIZING THE LEGITIMATE CHILD: THE COLORADO
SUPREME COURT INVALIDATES THE UNIFORM
PARENTAGE ACT PRESUMPTION OF
LEGITIMACY IN R.McG. v. .
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court in the last decade has raised the legal
status of illegitimate children to equal that of legitimate children.' At the
same time, the Court has elevated the rights of unwed fathers2 and elimi-
nated much gender-based discrimination. 3 These three disparate constitu-
tional law trends coalesced in a ground-breaking Colorado Supreme Court
decision, R.McG V. J W 4 The combination produced a legally mandated
but socially explosive result. R.McG. invalidated Uniform Parentage Act
(UPA)5 provisions denying standing to any man seeking to establish his pa-
ternity of a child born to a married couple that acknowledges the child as
their own.6 Thus, for the first time, a child born legitimately to a husband
and wife can be bastardized by a man claiming to be the child's biological
father. This comment explores the rationale and the social ramifications of
the Colorado Supreme Court's decision.
I. THE FACTUAL SETTING
C.W. was born in mid-1976, at the time the mother, J.W., was having
an affair with the plaintiff, R.McG. The mother's husband, W.W., was
named on the birth certificate as the child's father and accepted the infant as
his legitimate child.
7
In early 1978, R.McG. filed a Declaration of Paternity in the Denver
Juvenile Court on behalf of himself and the child, against the mother and
her husband.8 The complaint alleged that R.McG. was the natural father;
1. See, e.g., Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406
U.S. 164 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). See also the discussion of illegitimates'
rights, pp. 159-62 i7mfa.
2. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972). Set also the discussion of unwed fathers' rights, pp. 162-64 infra.
3. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
667 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See aLro the discussion of men's and women's
rights, pp. 164-66 infra.
4. 615 P.2d 666 (Colo. 1980).
5. Nine states have adopted legislation conforming to the Uniform Parentage Act. CAL.
CIV. CODE §§ 7000-7018 (West Supp. 1979); CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-6-101 to -129 (repl. 1978
& Supp. 1980); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 584-1 to -26 (1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 257.51-.74
(West Supp. 1980); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 40-6-101 to -131 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT.
126.011 to .391; N.D. Cruvr. CoDE §§ 14-17-01 to -26 (1979); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
26.26.010 to .905 (Supp. 1980); Wyo. STAT. §§ 14-7-101 to -126 (1977).
6. CoLO. REv. STAT. §§ 19-6-105, -107 (repl. 1978).
7. Affidavit of W.W. and J.W. in Support of Respondent's Motion for Summary Judg-
ment, R.McG. v. J.W., 615 P.2d 666 (Colo. 1980).
8. Necessary parties under Colorado law include the child, the natural mother, and each
presumed father, as well as each man alleged to be the natural father who is subject to the
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that he was the only man who had had sexual intercourse with the mother at
any possible time of conception; that the mother admitted he was the natu-
ral father; and that blood tests were unable to exclude him as the natural
father.
The defendants denied R.McG.'s allegations and moved for summary
judgment on the ground that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring the ac-
tion under the UPA.9 In their motion for summary judgment, the defend-
ants relied on a UPA provision' 0 denying standing to all but the mother, the
legally presumed father-in this case, the husband, W.W.-and their lineal
descendants. Discrimination against third-party fathers is justified, the de-
fendants claimed, due to the compelling state interest in keeping family units
intact.'1  The husband's accompanying affidavit stated that he believed
himself to be the natural father; that regardless of the outcome of the suit, he
would continue to treat the child as his natural offspring; and that he had
the desire and ability to continue providing for the child's support, nourish-
ment, protection, and care.' 2 The mother filed a similar affidavit.'"
R.McG. opposed summary judgment, claiming that the denial of his
standing to bring the action violated his right to equal protection under the
United States and Colorado Constitutions and under Colorado's equal rights
amendment.' 4 In his affidavit opposing summary judgment, R.McG. fur-
ther maintained that the mother acknowledged his paternity in a sworn
codicil to her will and in correspondence, and that the child had visited with
him almost daily until she was one-and-a-half years old. 5
Before hearing the motion for summary judgment, the juvenile court
appointed a guardian ad litem for the child,' 6 and approved the plaintiff's
request that Human Leukocyte Antigen (HLA) blood tests be administered
to the parties.' 7 The test results showed a 98.89% probability of R.McG.'s
paternity.' 8 No results were obtained for the husband, because an initial
blood sample was defective and he refused to submit to further tests.
The juvenile court referee then rejected the plaintiff's constitutional
claims and granted the motion for summary judgment, holding that third-
party fathers have no capacity to sue under the UPA.' 9 The referee was
court's jurisdiction. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 19-6-110 (repl. 1978). For a definition of "presumed
father," see note 70 infra.
9. 615 P.2d at 668.
10. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 19-6-107(1) (repl. 1978).
11. Memorandum Brief in Support of Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment at 9,
10.
12. Affidavit of W.W. in support of Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment at 1.
13. Affidavit of J.W. in Support of Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment at 1.
14. 615 P.2d at 668-69. Applicable provisions of the United States Constitution, the Colo-
rado Constitution, and Colorado's equal rights amendment are set forth in notes 24-26 mfra.
15. 615 P.2d at 668. In the codicil, J.W. swore that her present husband could not be the
father and that to the best of her knowledge R.McG. was the father. She requested that
R.McG. be appointed the child's guardian if she were to die while the child was still an unmar-
ried minor. Id.
16. As provided in CoLO. REV. STAT. § 19-6-110 (repl. 1978).
17. As provided in CoLo. REV. STAT. § 19-6-112 (repl. 1978) and § 13-25-126 (1973 &
Supp. 1980). 615 P.2d at 668.
18. See note 134 rnfla nd accompanying text.
19. 615 P.2d at 669.
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unwilling to allow the "turmoil and heartache" which would follow a judi-
cial declaration that the child was conceived of an adulterous relationship.
20
The referee's order was subsequently confirmed by the juvenile court
judge.2' The plaintiff appealed and the Colorado Court of Appeals trans-
ferred the case to the Colorado Supreme Court because of the constitutional
issues involved.
22
The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment order
and invalidated the UPA's standing provisions. 23 The court held that under
the circumstances of this case, the UPA's failure to grant R.McG. the right
to sue for a determination of his paternity violated equal protection of the
laws, under the federal24 and state constitutions 25 and the equal rights
amendment to the Colorado Constitution.
26
II. THE BACKGROUND ISSUES
At common law, illegitimacy bore a tremendous stigma. The law made
every presumption27 in favor of legitimacy to protect children from that le-
gal and social void. Gradually, the courts and legislatures removed many of
the disabilities imposed upon those born out of wedlock. In R.McG., the Col-
orado Supreme Court took the final step by holding that a legitimate child
could be declared illegitimate.28 This step represented a giant leap from the
common law, but only a small step from recent United States Supreme
Court decisions.29 To understand the evolutionary nature of the step taken
in R.McG., the historical development of the rights accorded to three
groups--illegitimates, unwed fathers, and men and women--needs to be ex-
plored.
A. The Rights of Ilegilimates
1. Under State and Common Law
In the past, the child born to an unmarried mother fell into a legal void.
He was known at common law asfihus nulhius, "the son of no one," orh'us
20. Order of Referee Rogers, Apr. 23, 1979, Record at 156.
21. Order of Judge Lawritson, Oct. 9, 1979, Record at 190.
22. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 13-4-1 10(l)(a) (1973) provides for the transfer of cases to the Col-
orado Supreme Court.
23. 615 P.2d at 667, 671-72.
24. "[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
25. "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law."
COLO. CONT. art. II, § 25.
26. "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the state of Colo-
rado or any of its political subdivisions on account of sex." COLO. CONST. art. II, § 29. Colo-
rado's due process clause, id. § 25, has been construed to include equal protection of the laws.
See Vanderhoof v. People, 152 Colo. 147, 380 P.2d 903 (1963); Trueblood v. Tinsley, 148 Colo.
503, 366 P.2d 655 (1961); People v. Max, 70 Colo. 100, 198 P. 150 (1921).
27. One of these presumptions is Lord Mansfield's Rule. See notes 128-133 tnfo and ac-
companying text.
28. Technically, under the Colorado UPA, the terms "legitimate" and "illegitimate"
should not be used since the statute does not use that terminology.
29. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 667 (1973); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535
(1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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popuh', "the son of the people."30 He was considered a ward of the village
parish, and neither his parents nor anyone else was required to support him.
He could neither inherit from his parents nor be legitimated by them.
3 '
Christianity, with its emphasis on monogamous marriages, likewise rated
him a non-entity. 32 The first statute according some status to illegitimates
was the English Poor Law Act of 1576, which imposed on both parents a
duty of support. 33 The law was not drafted out of concern for the children,
whose legal status remained in limbo; rather, it was an effort to relieve the
parishes of the financial burden of caring for them.
3 4
2. Under United States Supreme Court Decisions
The United States initially adopted the common lawfiius nullius doc-
trine and accorded the illegitimate no rights.3 5 By the early 1960's, compas-
sion and social justice had brought about legislation in some states that
tempered the legal impact of illegitimacy and further equalized the rights of
children.3 6 But many inequities remained until the United States Supreme
Court began invalidating discriminatory state statutes in 1968. In that year
the Court held that a state may not create a right of action in favor of chil-
dren for the wrongful death of a parent, yet exclude illegitimate children
from such a right. 37 Subsequently the Court has held that illegitimate chil-
dren may not be precluded from sharing equally with other children who
recover workmen's compensation benefits for the death of a parent,3 8 and
that illegitimates are not to be denied the child's right to support from his
natural father.3 9 In Gomez v. Perez, 4° the Court emphasized that "a State
may not invidiously discriminate against illegitimate chidren by denying
them substantial benefits accorded children generally."
'4'
More recently, the Supreme Court has recognized that some statutory
30. Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 111. App. 2d 240, 246, 190 N.E.2d 849, 856 (1963), cert. dtnied, 379
U.S. 945 (1964).
31. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 459 (1772).
32. H. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 1 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
KRAUSE ]. Biblical aversion to the bastard predates Christ: "A bastard shall not enter into the
congregation of the Lord; even to his tenth generation .... " Deuteronomy 23:2.
33. S. SCHATKIN, DISPUTED PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS § 1.08, at 1-28, § 1.09, at 1-30 (4th
rev. ed. 1975).
34. Id.
35. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES § 485 (1772). At common law, the doctrine of
flils nullius
expresses no mere technical uncertainty as to the fatherhood of the bastard, but rather
the moral antipathy, inculcated by the Church, to the irregular intercourse of which
he was the fruit. The Common Law might take note sometimes of the maternal ties of
blood but refused to follow the Civil Law in making them a conduit for inheritable
rights, and conferring on the issue of irregular unions a quasi-legitimacy as regards the
mother.
W. HOOPER, THE LAW OF ILLEGITIMACY 27 (1911). See genfraly id. at 100-24; KRAUSE, supra
note 32, at 9-57.
36. See, e.g., Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 111. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), crt. dtnia 379
U.S. 945 (1964).
37. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
38. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
39. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
40. 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
41. Id. at 538.
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classifications are necessary to protect overriding state concerns, such as pro-
tecting estates from fraudulent claims by alleged illegitimate offspring.
42
Consequently, the Court has wrestled with the technical proofs of
parenthood that may be legally required.43 In a recent case, Lahi v. Lali,44
the Court by a five-to-four decision, upheld a New York statutory scheme
requiring that certain evidence of paternity exists before a natural father's
death, if his offspring seek to inherit intestate from him. The Court stressed
that only an important state interest justifies statutory discrimination against
illegitimates: "Although . . . classifications based on illegitimacy are not
subject to 'strict scrutiny,' they nevertheless are invalid under the Fourteenth
Amendment if they are not substantially related to permissible state inter-
ests."
45
3. Under the Colorado Uniform Parentage Act
State legislation generally has not kept pace with the Supreme Court
decisions; substantial discrimination persists. 46 Two early uniform acts were
not well received and were withdrawn by the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws. 47 In a 1966 article, 48 Professor Harry D.
Krause of the University of Illinois College of Law sparked interest in a new
effort at uniform legislation. The result was the Uniform Parentage Act
(UPA) of 1973. Substantially similar legislation has been enacted by nine
states since 1975. 4 9 Colorado's version of the UPA went into effect in 1977.
Because the UPA has been adopted for only a few years in a small number of
states, little case law has developed.
The UPA's primary goal is to bring substantive legal equality to all
children regardless of the marital status of their parents. The concept is a
revolutionary one. 50
The substance of the UPA is expressed in the first two sections. First,
the Act defines the parent-child relationship as "the legal relationship ex-
isting between a child and his natural or adoptive parents incident to which
the law confers or imposes rights, privileges, duties, and obligations."'" Sec-
ond, the Act specifies that the parent-child relationship includes both
mother-and-child and father-and-child relationships, and extends equally to
42. See, e.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
43. See Parham v. Hughes, 441 US. 347 (1979); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978); Trimble
v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976); Labine v. Vincent, 401
U.S. 532 (1971).
44. 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
45. Id. at 265.
46. Setga,,raly KRAUSE, supra note 32, at 297-305. See also Wills, Paterniy Statutes: Thwart-
ing Equal Protectionfor Illegitimates, 32 U. MIMi L. REv. 339 (1977).
47. The Uniform Illegitimacy Act of 1922 and the Uniform Paternity Act of 1960, 9A
UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 579 (1979). Note the names of the three acts, which changed as
society's consciousness was raised-from "Illegitimacy" to "Paternity" to "Parentage."
48. Krause, Bn'ngt'ng the Bastard into the Great Soa'ty: A Proposad Unifom Act on Lqgitimaty, 44
Tax. L. REV. 829 (1966).
49. See note 5 supra.
50. 9A UNIFORM LAws ANNOTED 580 (1979).
51. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 19-6-102 (repl. 1978).
1981]
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every child and to every parent, regardless of the parents' marital status. 52
The remainder of the Act deals primarily with standing requirements.
Before R.McG., a man who claimed parental rights faced differing standing
and statute of limitation rules, depending on whether the child had a "pre-
sumed father" as defined by the Act. 53 R.McG. challenged the validity of
these separate classifications.
B. The Rights of Unwed Fathers
1. Under State and Common Law
When American states adopted the common law doctrine offhzus nul-
laus, the unwed father5 4 was treated as having, at most, a moral obligation to
provide support s.5  He owed no legal duty; he received no visitation rights.
56
The first changes in the law imposed duties of support, in an effort to relieve
welfare rolls, but conferred no attendant rights.57 More recently, legitima-
tion statutes have allowed the natural father to alter the child's status by
openly acknowledging him, and thence to acquire visitation, and even cus-
tody, rights.
58
2. Under United States Supreme Court Decisions
The United States Supreme Court first recognized an unwed father's
parental rights in Stanley v. Ilh'nos,59 a 1972 decision. Under an Illinois stat-
ute, minor illegitimate children automatically became wards of the state if
their mothers died. Although Stanley had never formally legitimated his
children, he had always acknowledged them as his own and had lived with
the mother intermittently over a period of eighteen years. In ruling the stat-
ute unconstitutional, the Court held that before a custody decision is made,
due process entitles the unwed father to a hearing on his fitness as a parent.
6 °
The Court decided the statute made an impermissible, irrebutable presump-
tion that all unmarried fathers are unsuitable. 6 1 The statute also violated
52. Id. §§ 19-6-102, -103.
53. See note 70 bnJ#a nd accompanying text.
54. All fathers who are not married to their child's mother are termed "unwed fathers."
They may also be called "non-marital fathers." The term "putative father" is often used inter-
changeably, but should be restricted to its definition: "the alleged or reputed father of an ille-
gitimate child." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1113 (5th ed. 1979). Thus R.McG. is technically
not a putative father because his child is legitimate. He is more correctly called a "claiming
natural father" or a "third-party father." These latter two terms were used by the court in the
instant case, but do not adequately express R.McG.'s status in relation to the mother's husband.
The fact that the law has no precise term for such would-be fathers indicates how new these
rights really are. This author favors coining the new term "extra-marital father" for a man who
claims to be the natural father of a child born to a married couple when both the mother and
her husband acknowledge the child as their natural offspring.
55. Note, Father ofan Ilegitimate Child-His Right to be Heard, 50 MINN. L. REV. 1071, 1072
(1966).
56. Id
57. See genera/ly W. WADLINGTON & M. PAULSEN, DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 8 (3rd ed.
1978).
58. Id.
59. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
60. Id. at 649.
61. Id. at 656-57.
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the equal protection rights of such fathers, because other similarly situated
parents i iere accorded the opportunity for a hearing.
62
Stant,.y produced much academic and legislative debate over the proper
extent of these newly found rights. Some commentators interpreted the deci-
sion narro 'ly as a procedural due process case which required only notice
and a hear ig before parental rights could be terminated. 63 Others inter-
preted it br -.dly as a substantive due process case requiring unwed fathers
to be given ihe same rights as all other parents.64 The debate was illumi-
nated--but vot resolved--by subsequent cases. Six years after Sanley, in
Quilloin v. We cotl,65 the Court, utilizing the "best interests of the child" test,
upheld the in ioluntary termination of an unwed father's parental rights af-
ter notice ant a hearing.
6 6 
More recently, in Caban v. Mohammed,
6 7 
the
Court, in reaff -ning the rights of unwed fathers who have established a
substantial relat onship with their children, used equal protection analysis to
strike down a Nw York adoption statute which set different standards for
unwed mothers . nd fathers. 68 Quilloin lends support to the procedural due
process interpretation of Stanley, while Caban supports the substantive due
process analysis.
3. Under the Colorado Uniform Parentage Act
After Sany and its progeny, there was no longer any doubt that the
Supreme Court included responsible unwed fathers when it declared that
parents have a basic right to their natural children.
6 9 
However, the UPA
was based on a wholly different premise.
The UPA set up two categories of fathers with different rights: first,
"presumed natural fathers" who were married to the child's mother at the
time of conception, or who performed some overt act of acknowledgement
later; second, all other fathers.
7 0 
If a child had a presumed father, another
man could assert his paternity only if he had the written consent of the pre-
62. Id. at 649.
63. See, e.g., Comment, Limiting the Boundaries of Stanley v. Illinois, 57 DEN. L.J. 671 (1980).
64. See, e.g., Comment, The Unwed Father's Rights in Adoption A~roceedings: A Case Study and
Legislatwve Critique, 40 ALB. L. REv. 543 (1976).
65. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
66. Id. at 256.
67. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
68. Id. at 391.
69. The rights to conceive and to raise one's children were deemed essential in Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); they were considered among the "basic civil rights of man"
in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). For a good review of these and other cases,
see Note, Unwed Fathers: An Analtical Swrey of That Parental Rights and Obhgawons, 1979 WASH.
U.L.Q. 1029. See also Comment, Equal Protection and tae Putative Father: An Analysis of Parham v.
Hughes and Caban v. Mohammed, 34 Sw. Lj. 717 (1980).
70. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-6-105 (repl. 1978). The UPA presumptions are complex.
Briefly, a man is presumed to be the natural father if he meets one of the following five condi-
tions: 1) The child is born or conceived during the father's marriage to the mother; 2) the
child is born or conceived during the father's cohabitation with the mother, after an attempt to
marry ceremonially, even though the marriage could be invalidated; 3) the child is born before
the father's marriage to the mother, and the father files a written acknowledgment of paternity,
or is voluntarily named as the father on the birth certificate, or is obligated to support the child
under a written voluntary promise or by court order; 4) the father receives the minor child into
his home and openly holds him out as his natural child; 5) the father files a written acknowl-
19811
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
sumed father, or if the presumption of paternity had been rebutted by some-
one else. 7 ' Standing to rebut the presumption was granted only to the
presumed father, the natural mother, and their lineal descendants. 72 Thus,
if the mother was married, an unwed father was realistically unable to prove
his paternity without the concurrence of one of the legal parents. Whenever
there was a harmonious family unit, as was the case in R.McG., an extra-
marital father could not establish his rights under the UPA.
73
This dual scheme was a deliberate move by the drafters, who sought to
protect the legitimacy of children born in wedlock.74 Although it reflected
an appropriate state interest in maintaining the integrity of family units, it
quite obviously discriminated against certain unwed fathers.
C. Equal Rights for Men and Women
1. Under State and Common Law
Western society's patriarchial culture has traditionally imposed signifi-
cant legal and social disabilities on women. Women were long forbidden to
vote and were denied educational and employment opportunities.7 5 English
law treated a married woman particularly badly-her husband controlled
her property, her contracts, her debts, her will, and her testimony.7 6 The
first women's movement, in the mid-19th century, resulted in married wo-
men's property acts in many states, which granted all women the right to
contract, to bring suit, and to sell their property. 77 Even these seemingly
innocuous rights did not gain nationwide acceptance, however. As late as
edgment of paternity with the court which is not disputed by the mother. COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 19-6-105 (repl. 1978).
71. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-6-105(1)(e), -105(2) (repl. 1978).
72. Id. § 19-6-107. Before the UPA was adopted in Colorado, fathers had no statutory
right to establish their paternity. Standing was granted only to mothers, guardians, and local
welfare agencies. Id. The Colorado UPA gave standing to certain categories of fathers. Id. See
People ex rel. L.B. 29 Colo. App. 101, 482 P.2d 1010 (1970), afd, 179 Colo. 11, 498 P.2d 1157
(1972), appeal dismissedmemn., 410 U.S. 976 (1973).
73. In the R.McG. case, the court dismissed the action without prejudice, to preserve the
child's right to bring suit at a later time. However, the court denied a motion by the guardian
ad /em to continue to pursue the suit because this would allow the claiming father to accom-
plish indirectly what he could not accomplish directly. Order of Judge Lawritson, Oct. 9,
1979, Record at 190. Hence, it is also unlikely that courts will allow putative fathers access
under the UPA through a suit brought by a descendant.
74. 9A UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 594 (1979); Krause, The Uniform Parentage Act, 8 FAM.
L.Q. 1 (1974). The views of Krause, the Act's reporter-drafter, were clear even before the Act
was formulated:
In the best interests of the child born illegitimately to a mam'ed mother, pursuing its
true paternity would not be indicated, unless the mother's husband has disavowed
paternity. For the same reason (protection of the family) that continues to support the
presumption of legitimacy of children born to a married mother, an illegitimate fa-
ther's claim to his child born 'legitimately' to a married mother should not be heard-
unless the mother's husband has disavowed paternity or consented to the legitimation
of the child by its actual father.
KRAUSE, supra note 32, at 97 (footnotes omitted). For a discussion recognizing the inherent
inequity of the policy, see Note, The Uniform Parentage Act. What It Will Meanfor the Putative Father
in Ca/iformia, 28 HASTINGS LJ. 191 (1976).
75. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973).
76. See generally W. WADLINGTON & M. PAULSEN, DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 5 (3rd ed.
1978); G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 3(c) (9th ed. 1975).
77. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973).
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1977, Alabama still forbade married women to convey or to mortgage their
real estate without the consent of their husbands.7"
The nineteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, passed
in 1920, gave women equal voting rights; full constitutional equality, how-
ever, awaits passage of the equal rights amendment. The proposed twenty-
seventh amendment, which states that "[elquality of rights under the law
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of sex," has sparked bitter controversy and has yet to be ratified by
the requisite number of states.
79
2. Under United States Supreme Court Decisions
For many years, the United States Supreme Court used a two-tier ap-
proach to judge the validity of statutes challenged under the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment. Most statutes, falling into the
traditional "lower tier," were required merely to bear some "rational rela-
tionship" to a legitimate state end and were invariably upheld.80 The "up-
per tier" test, which required justification by a "compelling state interest,"
was imposed upon statutes restricting fundamental rights and creating sus-
pect classifications such as race.8 ' Statutes subject to the latter tests were
most often invalidated, because they failed to fulfill the "strict scrutiny" re-
quirement that there be a compelling government interest unable to be
achieved by less restrictive alternatives.
8 2
Until recently, gender-based statutes were generally upheld because
they were subjected only to the lower tier, rational relationship test.8 3 In
1971, however, the Court radically changed its position in Reed v. Reed,
8 4
where it invalidated a statute which gave preference to men over women as
administrators of decedents' estates. Two years later, in Frontiero v. Richard-
son,85 four members of the Court voted to elevate gender to the status of a
suspect classs, but the idea never gained majority support. Instead, what has
emerged is a strong, middle-tier standard under which many discriminatory
schemes have been invalidated. The new "substantial relationship" test re-
quires that gender classes serve important government objectives, that their
purpose be both identifiable and substantial, and that the distinction be rea-
sonably structured so that all persons similarly situated are treated alike.
8 6
78. The Alabama statute was ruled unconstitutional, over a scathing dissent, in Peddy v.
Montgomery, 345 So. 2d 631 (Ala. 1977).
79. Three more states are needed to ratify the amendment before the June 30, 1982 dead-
line. NEWSWEEK, July 13, 1981, at 24, col. I.
80. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
81. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
82. Set, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
83. See, rg., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948), omnded, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976).
84. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
85. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
86. E.g., Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeny, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Caban v. Mohammed,
441 U.S. 380 (1979); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979); Orr v. Orr. 440 U.S. 268 (1979);
Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Weber v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972). Se Comment, Equal Protection and the "Aiddle Ter" The
Impact on Women and Illegitimater, 54 NOTRE DAM E LAW. 303 (1978).
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Initially, the Court seemed unwilling to apply this middle tier, height-
ened scrutiny to strike down statutes that discriminated against men rather
than against women. 87 Recent cases have shown a more even-handed ap-
proach, unless the challenged statute is clearly an ameliorative measure
aimed at correcting past discrimination.m The 1979 Caban v. Mohammed8 9
decision, which rested on gender-based equal protection grounds, exemplifies
the more recent trend. In Caban, the Court found the statute to be another
example of overbroad generalizations in gender-based classifications, the ef-
fect of which is to discriminate impermissibly against unwed fathers while
according rights to similarly situated mothers. 9° This undifferentiated dis-
tinction, the Court maintained, does not bear a substantial relationship to
the state's asserted interests.
9
1
3. Under the Colorado Equal Rights Amendment (ERA)
Colorado's ERA states that equality of rights under the law cannot be
denied on account of sex.92 The amendment, which became part of the state
constitution in early 1973, was first applied in People v. Green. 93 Although the
Colorado Supreme Court upheld the rape statute challenged in that case,
the court ruled that the ERA requires application of the strict scrutiny test
to all such gender-based statutes. 94 Thus, in Colorado, gender-based classifi-
cations challenged on equal protection grounds must meet the strictest judi-
cial test.95
III. THE INSTANT CASE
The Colorado Supreme Court's three opinions in R.McG. clearly reflect
the three currently popular legal viewpoints regarding the right of unwed
fathers to seek parental rights to a legitimate child. The majority, utilizing
equal protection analysis, found that the statute was invalid because it im-
permissibly discriminated between natural mothers and claiming natural fa-
thers. 96 The concurring opinion analyzed the father's rights in terms of
procedural due process safeguards. The dissent found both arguments over-
ridden by the compelling state interest in fostering harmonious legal family
units.
87. Eg., Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
88. Eg., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (granting rights to unwed fathers);
Orr. v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (invalidating statute requiring only husbands to pay alimony);
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (invalidating statute prohibiting beer sales to males under
21 and females under 18).
89. 441 U.S. 380 (1979). Cahan was the first unwed father case to face directly the equal
protection issues. The Court in Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), had refused to con-
sider gender-based issues raised in the brief because they were not in the jurisdictional state-
ment. Id. at 253 n.13.
90. 441 U.S. at 394.
91. Id.
92. See note 26 supra.
93. 183 Colo. 25, 514 P.2d 769 (1973).
94. Id. at 28, 514 P.2d at 770.
95. Ad.
96. See note 54 supra.
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A. The Majoriy: Equal Protection Rights
Justice Quinn's majority opinion first recognized the important state
interest involved in preserving family harmony,97 and then proceeded to
weigh that interest against the UPA's gender-based classification, under the
intermediate standard of judicial scrutiny used in Caban v. Mohammed.98
Here, the court found that the challenged UPA provision created more than
a difference in treatment; it created diametrically opposite treatments.9 9 A
natural mother can sue a non-spousal father for paternity and disrupt the
father's family harmony, even if, as in this case, he is married to someone else
and has other children. Claiming natural fathers, on the other hand, are not
allowed to disrupt a married mother's family harmony by suing her to claim
parental rights. According to the court, such a gender-based classification is
precisely the kind of overbroad generalization invalidated in Caban and in
Stanley.10 The court distinguished Quilloin v. Walcott 0 by noting that the
father in that case had never sought custody yet was still accorded a full
hearing. 102
Although the UPA states that all its presumptions are rebuttable by
clear and convincing evidence, 10 3 the court noted that for fathers like
R.McG. (even with a threshold showing of 98.89% probability of his pater-
nity), the presumption in favor of the mother's husband is actually irrebut-
table because such extra-marital fathers are precluded from suing.
According to the majority in R.McG., such a presumption is impermissible
under the Stanley doctrine. 1°' Equal protection doctrines under both the
United States and Colorado Constitutions 10 5 mandate equal judicial access
for natural mothers and claiming natural fathers. Justice Quinn concluded
that since the statute failed to satisfy the intermediate level of judicial scru-
tiny, it also failed to satisfy the stricter judicial scrutiny demanded by the
Colorado equal rights amendment, 10 6 and by People v. Greene .
1 07
The majority rejected the defendants' due process right of privacy
97. 615 P.2d at 670.
98. The standard used in Cahan is as follows:
[The unquestioned right of the State to further these desirable ends by legislation is
not in itself sufficient to justify the gender-based distinction .... Rather, under the
relevant cases applying the Equal Protection Clause it must be shown that the distinc-
tion is structured reasonably to further these ends .... [Siuch a statutory classifica-
tion 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.' Royster Guano Co. v. Irgtnta, 253 U.S.
412, 415 [(1920)].
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. at 391.
99. 615 P.2d at 671.
100. Id.
101. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
102. 615 P.2d at 671.
103. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 19-6-105(2) (repl. 1978).
104. The court quoted Stan!ky for the proposition that "when that procedure forecloses the
determinative issues . . . [and] explicitly disdains present realities in deference to past formali-
ties, it needlessly risks running roughshod over the important interests of both parent and
child." 615 P.2d at 671.
105. See notes 24, 25 supra.
106. 615 P.2d at 672.
107. 183 Colo. 25, 514 P.2d 769 (1973).
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claims, stating that the interest they might have in protecting their family
harmony was no greater than the interest of R.McG. in establishing his pa-
ternity, and the interest of the child in determining his or her biological
parentage. 10 8 The court recognized that continuing the action could disrupt
the mother's marriage and negatively influence the child's life; however, the
court also acknowledged that the best interests of the child are not necessar-
ily the same as those of the legal parents, and that these interests are ex-
tremely difficult to determine. 10 9
Thus, the majority held that if a natural mother is allowed to sue for a
Declaration of Paternity in cases where the child has a presumed father, a
claiming natural father must be given the same opportunity.°10 The court
reversed the lower court's summary judgment and remanded the case to the
juvenile court. ' 1
B. The Concurrence.- Due Process Rights
Justice Dubofsky's special concurring opinion relied on due process, in
treading a middle path between the majority and the dissent. She stated
that the legislature may give preference in paternity proceedings to a
mother's family unit in which the child resides, without violating equal pro-
tection guarantees."12 This permissible preference, however, does not justify
the statute's strong presumption of legitimacy. Due process requires that
putative fathers have access to the courtroom, since Stanley held that a fit
natural father has a due process right to maintain a parental relationship
with his- illegitimate child.
1 13
In order to determine the unwed father's due process rights, Justice
Dubofsky weighed the unwed father's expressions of interest in the child
against the state's interest in protecting the integrity of the family unit.,t
4
Had the father not made continuing efforts to maintain contact and support
the child, the state's interest would have prevailed:
108. 615 P.2d at 672. The opinion cites Caban,Stanlqy, andInre Lisa R., 13 Cal. 3d 636, 532
P.2d 123, 119 Cal. Rptr. 475, cert. denitd, 421 U.S. 1014 (1975). The Lisa R. case held CAL.
EVID. CODE § 661 (West 1966) constitutionally defective because it denied the use of the courts
to an unwed father seeking to establish his parenthood of a minor child whose legal parents had
died. The California Supreme Court found this denial of access to be unreasonable, arbitrary
and capricious, as well as a violation of due process rights. 13 Cal.3d at 651, 532 P.2d at 133,
119 Cal. Rptr. at 485. Subsequently, the state legislature replaced the statute with a UPA
provision granting standing to a wide range of persons, including putative fathers. CAL. CIV.
CODE § 7008 (West Supp. 1981). See Comment, In Re Lisa R.-Limittng the S&ope ofthe Conclusise
Presumption Doctine, 13 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 377 (1976); Note, In Re Lisa R., 3 PEPPERDINE L.
REV. 212 (1975).
109. 615 P.2d at 672.
110. Id.
111. On remand the Denver Juvenile Court entered a Declaration of Paternity in favor of
R.McG., following a stipulation to that effect by the mother and the presumed father. R.McG.
v. J.W., No. P-20082 (Den. Juv. Ct. Order, May 1981).
112. 615 P.2d at 672-73 (Dubofsky, J., concurring).
113. Id. at 673. The concurring opinion also recognized Lira R., as persuasive authority for
this proposition. See note 108 supra.
114. The due process cases on which Justice Dubofsky relied are Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564 (1972); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm.
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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But here, where R.McG. has no alternative remedy to protect his
interest as the child's natural father, I think we must find that he
has standing to assert those interests in a court proceeding. Other-
wise, his constitutional right to due process of law in order to pro-
tect his basic right to conceive and raise his child has been
denied. 115
C. The Dissent: Overridng State Interests
Justice Lohr's dissent found both equal protection and due process ar-
guments outweighed by the compelling state interest in fostering harmonious
marital relationships and strong family ties.'1 6 The dissent began by quot-
ing the purposes of the Colorado Children's Code 1 7 (of which the UPA is a
part): to serve the best interest of the child and to strengthen the family.' 18
Justice Lohr maintained that UPA presumptions of paternity faithfully im-
plement these declared legislative purposes which must be liberally con-
strued under the statute. 1 9
Justice Lohr, addressing the equal protection issue, stated that no prior
court has ever extended the Stanley doctrine to find that a man other than
the mother's husband possessed an interest in determining the parental sta-
tus of a child born in wedlock.' 20 The dissenting Justice, noting that adul-
tery is still a crime in Colorado, stated, "it requires more imagination than I
can summon to find any legitimate expectation of a legally recognized rela-
tionship based solely on the blood ties between the child conceived of an
adulterous relationship and the natural father of that child."'
12 1
According to the dissent, the appropriate judicial standard for testing
R.McG.'s claims is the lower tier, rational relationship test, under which the
challenged classification would prevail. 122 For example, when family rela-
tionships become so disintegrated that someone within the family wishes to
challenge the husband's paternity, the legislature could reasonably deter-
mine that no useful purpose would be served by preventing that person from
doing so.123 Justice Lohr rejected the majority view that the challenged clas-
sification was gender-based, since both sexes are among persons able to sue
in paternity proceedings. Therefore, he declined to apply the higher level of
scrutiny demanded for gender-based statutes' 24 and, further, found it unnec-
115. 615 P.2d at 673-74 (Dubofsky, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 674-75 (Lohr, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 674; CoLo. REv. STAT. § 19-1-102 (repl. 1978 & Supp. 1980). For cases imple-
menting these policies, see R.M. v. District Court, 191 Colo. 42, 550 P.2d 346 (1976); People ex
rel. M.M., 184 Colo. 298, 520 P.2d 128 (1974). Se also People ex retl. S.S.T., 38 Colo. App. 110,
553 P.2d 82 (1976).
118. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-102(i)(a), -102(l)(b) (repl. 1978).
119. 615 P.2d at 674 (Lohr, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 676.
121. Id.
122. Id. The two Colorado cases upon which Justice Lohr relied are Mosgrove v. Town of
Federal Heights, 190 Colo. 1, 543 P.2d 715 (1975) and People ex rel. L.B., 179 Colo. 11,498 P.2d
1157 (1972), appeal dismissed mem., 410 U.S. 976 (1973).
123. 615 P.2d at 676 (Lohr, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 677. Justice Lohr stated that if he were to utilize the substantial interest test, the
classification would still survive. Id.
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essary to apply the Colorado equal rights amendment. 25
Turning to the concurring due process arguments, Justice Lohr applied
the same balancing test as Justice Dubofsky had, but he reached the opposite
result, finding that public policy considerations outweighed the private in-
terests of the extra-marital father in this case.' 2 6 To Justice Lohr "the im-
portant criteria would be the duration and quality of the relationship of the
parties, not the probability that the third-party father could in fact prove
paternity."1
27
IV. THE SOCIAL CONSIDERATIONS
The presumption that a child conceived during a lawful marriage is
legitimate is one of the oldest and strongest presumptions in Anglo-American
law.1 2 8 It was long supported by an evidentiary rule which rendered a hus-
band and wife incompetent to rebut the presumption by testifying that they
had not engaged in sexual intercourse at the time of conception. The pre-
cept became known as Lord Mansfield's Rule after the English peer articu-
lated it in a 1777 ejectment case, declaring that "decency, morality, and
policy" required that husbands and wives be barred from bastardizing their
offspring. '
29
Some American states continue to employ a conclusive presumption of
legitimacy. For instance, in 1967 a California appellate court held that a
mixed race child born to a Caucasian woman was the legitimate child of the
mother's Caucasian husband.' 30 Other state laws contain a rebuttable pre-
sumption of legitimacy, yet make rebuttal quite difficult.' 3 1 Colorado re-
jected Lord Mansfield's Rule in 1959, but continues to uphold the strong
presumption of legitimacy.13 2 Just four months before the R.McG. decision,
in fact, the Colorado Supreme Court held that children with married par-
ents enjoy a strong presumption of legitimacy and should be able to rely on
it absent a paternity challenge by the presumed father.
133
R.AMcG. has not destroyed the traditional presumption of legitimacy in
Colorado, but has severely weakened it. The presumption still exists; how-
ever, any extra-marital father-indeed, probably any interested person-
may now attack it.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 677-78.
127. Id. at 678. Justice Lohr referred to Justice Stewart's dissent in Caban, in which the
latter stated, "[plarental rights do not spring full blown from the biological connection between
parent and child. They require relationships more enduring." 615 P.2d at 678 n.9 (citing
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
128. In In re Findlay, 253 N.Y. 1, 170 N.E. 471 (1930), Justice Cardozo said the presumption
could not fail unless common sense and reason are outraged by it. For a good general discus-
sion, set Note, Evidence-Incompetery of a Husband and Wife to Testif as to Nonaccess so as to Bastard-
ize a Child, 6 GA. ST. B.J. 448 (1970).
129. Goodright v. Moss, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257, 1257-58 (K.B. 1777).
130. Hess v. Whitsitt, 257 Cal. App. 2d 552, 65 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1967). Accord, In re Marriage
of A., 41 Or. App. 679, 598 P.2d 1258 (1979).
131. E.g., Stewart v. Stewart, 91 Mich. App. 602, 283 N.W.2d 809 (1979).
132. Vasquez v. Esquibel, 141 Colo. 5, 346 P.2d 293 (1959). See also Beck v. Beck, 153 Colo.
90, 384 P.2d 731 (1963); Lanford v. Lanford, 151 Colo. 211, 377 P.2d 115 (1962).
133. A.G. v. S.G., 609 P.2d 121 (Colo. 1980).
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Such an attack today has a much greater chance of success than ever
before. Just a few years ago, a true natural father in R.McG.'s situation
probably would have lost his case, even if he could have obtained standing
to bring the action to trial, because he could have mustered little scientific
evidence to rebut the strong presumption of legitimacy. The blood tests then
available were often inconclusive and only excluded certain fathers; they did
not definitely establish paternity. Today, however, the new HLA tissue test-
ing procedure has made it possible to determine paternity much more accu-
rately. In approximately 90% of blood samples tested, the HLA procedure
either absolutely excludes the tested party as the father, or rates his
probability of paternity at over 90%.134 Such evidence should be sufficient
to rebut any presumption except a legally conclusive one. The Colorado
Supreme Court was obviously influenced by what it called R.McG.'s
"threshold showing of 98.89% probability of paternity."' 135
Thus, before HLA testing existed, the rebuttable presumption of legiti-
macy acted as an almost insurmountable barrier to extra-marital fathers.1
36
Today, the presumption is more readily rebuttable. That is one reason
R.McG. is so significant.
Many people, like the dissenting Justice Lohr, fear that the R.McG. de-
cision will have a serious adverse social impact.' 37 The defendants, in their
appellate brief, stated that "the cost of abstract truth is dear when con-
trasted with the damage to.the child and his or her family ... .
Others, such as this author, believe that the decision was legally impera-
tive regardless of the costs, and that those costs will not be excessive. Society
must always pay a price for its freedoms. The price in this instance may be
the destruction of some family units. However, many of those units would
be destroyed by their complicated parental situation, even without the inter-
vention of the legal process. Also, it should not be assumed that many extra-
marital fathers will use this new avenue simply because it is now open to
them. Only the most persistent and concerned claiming fathers are likely to
pursue an action which may destroy their own family units and will, if suc-
cessful, require substantial support obligations.
R.McG. believed that the law should not protect outmoded fictions. He
maintained in his appellate brief that in the past, fictional presumptions
were needed for the orderly support of society's children because at that time
it was impossible to prove paternity. "But to try to foist such fictions on a
134. Comment, Patenity Testing with the Human Leukocyte Antigen System: A Medicolegal Break-
through, 20 SANTA CLARA LAw. 511 (1980). The HLA system was developed in 1964 at the
University of California at Los Angeles (U.C.L.A.) School of Medicine, for the purpose of
matching tissues precisely to minimize the possibility of organ transplant rejection. U.C.L.A.
now has a large HLA paternity evaluation program, where the R.McG. tests were carried out.
States were slow to recognize the new technology, but as early as 1976 the American Medical
Association and American Bar Association recommended use of the HLA test. SeeJoint AM.A-
ABA Cwde/ines: Present Status of Strologis Testing in Proens of Disputed Parentage, 10 FAM. L.Q. 247
(1976). Since then, most states which have considered the matter have accepted HLA testing.
FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 1173 (Sept. 16, 1980).
135. 615 P.2d at 671.
136. See note 54 supra.
137. 615 P.2d at 676.
138. Memorandum Brief in Support of Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment at 9.
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family in 1979," he said, "is a destructive anachronism.
'139
Every child has a right to know his or her biological heritage. 140 In
addition to the obvious medical and economic considerations favoring such
knowledge, many people, including the author, believe that the child has an
essential right to the truth simply because it is the truth. In constitutional
terms, the child has a substantive due process right to his own per-
sonhood. 141
American society is no longer composed of neat nuclear units of biologi-
cal families. Many children live with adults who are not their biological
parents. 142 If children can adjust to stepfathers, adoptive fathers, live-in fa-
thers, intermittent fathers and absent fathers, they can adjust to having two
fathers, both of whom want them-a biological one with visitation rights
and a "psychological" one with whom they live. If R.McG. is successful in
establishing his parenthood, the child, one hopes, will be loved, supported
and cared for by two fathers. Surely in today's world that is not such an
adverse result.
Ltnda Shoemaker
139. Memorandum Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at
10.
140. In re Adoption of Tachick, 60 Wis. 2d 540, 551, 210 N.W.2d 865, 871 (1973). Note also
the increasingly militant stands taken by adult adoptees in search of their biological roots, e.g.,
Alma Soc'y Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir. 1979).
141. Craven, Personhod" The Right to be Let Alone, 1976 DUKE L.J. 699, 702.
142. Many academicians have argued that the rights of the natural "biological" parent are
less important than those of the "psychological" parent to whom the child is attached. Muench
& Levy, Psychological Parentage: A Natural Right, 13 FAM. L.Q. 129 (1979).
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